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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of China as an important player in the world stage has become a significant 
phenomenon in recent years. With China’s increasing enthusiasm toward regional cooperation 
in East Asia1 since the Asian Financial Crisis, the discussion on China’s rise and its regional 
strategy has raised growing concerns within the international community of states and 
especially among China’s neighbours. While some observers view China’s great activism in 
regional cooperation as a bid for regional hegemony, others consider it as promoting economic 
interdependence and mutual interests. Will China’s rise be more peaceful, or will it threaten the 
regional and global stability? Will China use its growing military power to assert its territorial 
claims, or will it be constrained by economic interdependence? Will a rising China challenge 
the rule of the international community, or will it comply with the current international regimes? 
These questions have been heatedly debated by Western scholars and analysts.  
In this article, three major paradigms – realism, liberalism and constructivism – on the rise of 
China and China’s regional strategy will be explored respectively. Following the examination 
of both the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective, this article argues that each 
theoretical theory alone is inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of China’s regional 
strategy in East Asia since the late 1990s. While sometimes they are considered as competing 
approaches, these different theoretical perspectives supplement each other. It concludes that 
only a combination of material interests and ideational factors at both the domestic and 
systematic level can deepen our understanding of China’s regional behaviour.  
2. THE REALIST APPROACH 
2.1 Realist theories on the rise of China  
Generally speaking, realism 2  is based on the assumptions that: the international system is 
anarchic; sovereign states are central actors in world politics and are rational agents; there is no 
central authority governing the behaviours of states (Morgenthau 1973, p.10, Waltz 1979, p.95);  
the structure of the international system shapes the behaviour of states (Gilpin 1981, p.10; 
Morgenthau 1978; Waltz 1979); states often fail to cooperate (Waltz 1979, p.115-116; 
                                                 
1 Defining the region is not easy. For the purpose of this article, East Asia is defined as ASEAN states plus China, 
Japan and South Korea.  
2 Here I do not distinguish between classical realism and neo-realism, as on the core assumptions, mentioned here, 
their points are similar. To be sure, realism is a general paradigm that includes a wide range of therories: classical 
realism, neo-realism (defensive realism and offensive realism) and so on. While they agree on the some basic 
assumptions, there are substantial differences among them. For instance, regarding the question why states pursue 
power, classical realism and neorealism have different answers. For classical realists, such as Morgenthau, it is due 
to the human nature. For neorealists, such as Waltz and Gilpin, it is due to the structure of the international system.   
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Morgenthau 1973, p.512) and in order to survive in such a self-help system, states have to 
struggle for power (Morgenthau 1973, p.12).  
Realism seems to offer a compelling explanation for the ‘China threat’. Realists focus on the 
shift of power relations in the international system between states. Robert Gilpin suggests that 
as the power of a state increases, ‘a state will seek to change the international system through 
territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal 
to or greater than the marginal benefits’ (Gilpin 1981: 106). Starting from these premises 
realists claim that China is dissatisfied with the existing international structure and the power 
relations it generates, and thus seeks to challenge the status quo (Buzan and Segal 1994, p.6; 
Gernstein and Munro 1997). Some have argued that China’s final goal is to obtain global 
hegemony (Yee and Storey 2002, p.7).  
Many realists offer a pessimistic scenario of the consequences of a stronger China for the 
international society. To many realists, the challenge which a rising China will pose to 
international community will be difficult to circumvent. Some others even suggest that Asia is 
becoming ‘Sino-centred’ (Zakaria 2005; Heberer 1999). 
Many realists, like Stephens (2005), Sutter (2005b) and Roy (2003), consider that China’s 
regional strategy is to challenge America’s position in East Asia. They believe that China’s rise 
will be zero-sum game between China and the US. For some other realists, such as Friedberg 
(1993), Organski and Kugler (1980), a dissatisfied great power will be likely to challenge the 
dominant state and it could possibly lead to conflicts and wars. China, accordingly, falls into 
this category. This group of realists predict a ‘coming conflict’ between China and the US.  
2.2 Historical analogies 
While these voices warn of China’s growing threat to the US, few are theoretically examined. 
In this sense, John Mearsheimer’s argument deserves our specific attention. Mearsheimer, one 
of the most influential proponents of a branch of realism named offensive realism, offers a 
strong defense of the theory and its application to China’s conflict with the US. According to 
Mearsheimer, survival is a state’s most important goal. If a state survives, it can pursue any 
other goals. The structure of international system forces states to compete with each other for 
power (Mearsheimer 2006, p.160). Mearsheimer shares the point with many other realists, such 
as Kenneth Waltz (Waltz 1979). However, for Mearsheimer, states always strive to maximize 
their powers (Mearsheimer 2001, p.145)3.  
Mearsheimer applies the same logic to China. According to him, a rising China is ‘likely to try 
to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the 
                                                 
3 In contrast, Waltz argues that ‘states balance power rather than maximize it. States can seldom afford to make 
maximum power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that.’ (Waltz 1979: 127)  
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Western Hemisphere.’ Mearsheimer suggests that China would ‘come up with its own version 
of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s’ (Mearsheimer 2006, p.162).  
Mearsheimer’s argument seems problematic. His conclusion that China will threaten the US is 
simply based upon historical analogies from the American experience. While Mearsheimer’s 
theory of offensive realism might be powerful to explain the foreign policy of the US, it does 
not mean that his theory can fully explain the whole picture of contemporary Chinese foreign 
policy and regional strategy. As Johnston (2003, p.28) suggests, ‘historical analogies are 
analogies, not causes or explanations. Analogical arguments tend to haphazardly pick and 
choose the similarities to focus on while ignoring potentially important differences’. Actually 
states have their distinctive characteristics which will differentiate themselves from others. 
Some typical characteristics of Chinese foreign policy are influenced by China’s unique 
historical experience. For instance, the perception of how the Chinese views China’s position in 
the world is a controversially mixed attitude of China being both a great power and a weak 
power. On the one hand, due to its size, culture and history, China views itself as a great power. 
The rise of China is often described by many Chinese as ‘daguo jueqi’ [the rise of a great 
power]. China tries to shape itself as a great power in the world. China wants to demonstrate to 
the world that it could be a great power economically and politically, and perhaps finally 
achieve the same position as the US (Kurlantzick 2007, p.42). Meanwhile, ‘Daguo guanxi’ [the 
great power relations] is always the most important issue in China’s approach to foreign policy 
(People’s Daily 16 March 2009). On the other hand, many Chinese think that China is still 
weak economically and politically. A lot of areas, especially the western part of China, are still 
undeveloped. In some occasions, such as China’s application for the WTO membership, 
Chinese leaders requested special privileges due to its economic underdevelopment.  
Some other realists, such as Yuankang Wang (2004), do present some historical evidence from 
imperial China in order to illustrate the power of offensive realism. By presenting evidence 
from two specific periods in Chinese history, the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644), Wang attempts to illustrate that historically Chinese policymakers have 
sought to maximize China’s relative power until the state achieved a predominant position in 
East Asia (Wang 2004, p.184-190). However, Wang’s argument is problematic as he merely 
makes a contemporary inference from particular parts of Chinese history. Wang has not 
explained clearly why China’s foreign policy today should definitely have inherited some 
specific historical experiences like the China-centred imperial system of Song Dynasty and 
Ming Dynasty, rather than others and ignores the question of why  the current Chinese foreign 
policy should not have been changed by new and different historical conditions? 
2.3 The rapid expansion of China’s military capability 
Besides the scholars above whose arguments are based upon historical analogies, some others 
who argue that China will balance against the US in East Asia typically point to the rapid 
expansion of China’s military capability. Swaine (2005) has stressed some critical 
developments in China’s increased regional military capability and pointed out that the final 
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goal of these military modernization developments is to counter the US. Bates Gill (2005) 
draws attention to the fact that China’s defence budget increased dramatically in the last two 
decades. The official Chinese defence budget rose twice from 1989 to 2000. Then, it increased 
by 17 percent in 2001, 17.7 percent in 2002, and 9.6 percent in 2003 (Gill 2005, p.131). In 
addition, Gill notes that China spent an average of about $750 million every year from 1989 to 
1999 in purchasing foreign weapons. In 2001 the spending was doubled as it was in 1999. In 
terms of whether the US and China will come into conflict, Gill indicates that the presence of 
the US in East Asia will obstruct the development of China’s military power.  
There seems to be no doubt that the rate of increase in Chinese military expenditures has grown 
dramatically in the last decade. China’s military expenditure increased by 194 per cent from 
1999 to 2008, the highest among the top five military spenders. In particular, China for the first 
time became the second largest military spender in the world in 2008 (SIPRI yearbook 2009, 
p.183).  
However, compared with the US, China spends relatively little on its military. From the table 
below, the US, with nearly 42 percent of the total, has the largest share in the world. China’s 
military spending is merely about one eighth that of the US. Clearly, China’s military 
expenditure is too far to reach the level of the US. 
The five states with the highest military expenditure in 2008 
Rank Country Spending 
($ billion) 
World 
share 
(%) 
Spending 
per capita 
($) 
Percentage of 
GDP (%) 
Change, 
1999-2008 
(%) 
1 US 607 41.5 1967 4 66.5 
2 China 84.9 5.8 63 2 194 
3 France 65.7 4.5 1061 2.3 3.5 
4 UK 65.3 4.5 1070 2.4 20.7 
5 Russia 58.6 4.0 413 3.5 173 
 
Sub-total top 5 882 60 -- -- -- 
World 1464 100 217 2.4 44.7 
Sources: SIPRI Yearbook  
More importantly, the absolute size of China’s annual military spending growth cannot explain 
everything. If the military expenditure is measured by the percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), it could be found that the increase of China’s military expenditure is quite 
moderate. According to the data above, China’s military spending accounted for merely 2 per 
cent of its GDP. In contrast, the US spent 4 per cent of its GDP, twice as much as China did 
proportionately. The figure also indicates that China was the smallest spender among the top 
five military spenders in 2008. China’s military spending as a share of its GDP was even lower 
than the world’s average level. As Johnston suggests, ‘as a percentage of GDP, Chinese 
military expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the 
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Chinese economy is being militarized and mobilized to balance against US power’ (Johnston 
2003, p.39). 
2.4 Regional cooperation to exclude the US 
From the 1990s, China’s growing active multilateral diplomacy in East Asian regional 
cooperation is viewed by many realist scholars, such as Sutter (2005b) and Kurlantzick (2007), 
as being directed at weakening the predominance of the US in East Asia and undermining the 
US alliances in this region. In their view, China’s strategic objective in regional cooperation in 
East Asia is to push the US out of Asia and ultimately achieve regional hegemony. Sutter 
(2005b) suggests that by promoting the Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN (ASEAN-China 
FTA), and by promoting the Asia-only group (ASEAN Plus Three) with other East Asian states, 
China has manoeuvred explicitly to exclude the US. Southeast Asia has already become a 
major place for China to marginalize the US.  In addition, Kurlantzick suggests that through 
regional cooperation in East Asia, China’s influence is growing at the expense of the US 
(Kurlantzik 2007). Consequently, East Asian states could be forced to choose sides between 
Washington and Beijing. 
Again, Sutter and Kurlantzick’s interpretations are over-simplistic and cannot explain the 
totality of China’s regional strategy in East Asia. It ignores the domestic decision-making 
process in China. Johnson’s point could be correct: for some in China, particularly the 
hardliners in the PLA or the Ministry of Defense, constraining  American influence in East 
Asia might be part of the strategic consideration to promote the ASEAN Plus Three. However, 
China’s enthusiasm  for  regional cooperation in East Asia was not promoted by this group of 
people, but largely driven by China’s economic reformers, such as Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao 
(Johnston 2003, p.52). In fact, this is a common weakness in realist, as well as liberal, 
perspectives. Realism’s state-centric focus fails to see that domestic politics had had an 
influence on Chinese foreign policy. Realists argue that states are the central actors in 
international politics and that domestic politics plays little role in international politics and find 
it difficult to incorporate theories of domestic politics into their analysis in a consistent manner.   
In sum, realists especially those who emphasize the China threat consider the emerging China 
as a dissatisfied power, which will challenge the dominant powers in the world. Their 
conclusion is premature. Some of them simply apply other states’ experience to China, others 
wrongly generalise about China’s grand strategy from one or two selected historical dynasties. 
In addition the state-centric focus of realists fails to see the influence of domestic politics on the 
international system. Based on the analysis above, it is easy to find that realist perspectives, 
especially the offensive realism, are over simplistic to explain the whole story of China’s 
regional strategy in East Asia. 
3. THE LIBERAL APPROACH 
3.1 Liberal/Neoliberal Theories and Economic Interdependence 
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Generally speaking, liberals contend that the increase of economic interdependence will 
decrease the likelihood of political conflicts. According to Cooper (1972), ‘economic 
interdependence’ refers to ‘the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more 
nations to economic developments within those nations’ (Cooper 1972, p.159). Keohane and 
Nye (1977) define ‘economic interdependence’ in a broader sense. According to Keohane and 
Nye, the international system is characterized by ‘complex interdependence’, which is 
‘reciprocal effects among states’ due to ‘international transactions: such as flows of money, 
goods, people and messages across international boundaries’ (Keohane and Nye 1977, p.8-9). 
In the context of complex interdependence, non-governmental actors, such as international 
organizations, impact significantly on economic interactions between states and thereby play a 
significant role in international relations. With the close interconnection between states, 
Keohane and Nye (1977) suggest that the likelihood of the use of force will decrease.4 In 
addition, Mitrany (1943) suggests that economic interdependency has a ‘spill-over’ effect.  
3.2 China in the interdependent East Asian Economy  
With respect to China, are these liberal arguments accurate? Many liberals, such as Christopher 
Findlay and Andrew Watson (1997) and Lampton (2005), argue that China is more and more 
involved in the process of ‘complex interdependence’ described by Keohane and Nye (1976). 
For instance, Lampton (2005, p.307) suggests that ‘regional cooperation is currently seen in 
Beijing as a more feasible way to protect economic interests and interdependencies than a 
ruinous drive for military power that Beijing’s leaders believe brought the Soviet Union down’. 
Similarly, Findlay and Watson (1997) demonstrate that China’s interaction with the world 
economy increases the level of economic interdependency between China and the rest of the 
world.  
More importantly, according to Findlay and Watson (1997), growing economic 
interdependency has transformed the relationship between China and the rest of the world in a 
constructive way. On the one hand, China has become more dependent on the rest of the world 
to sustain its current growth. On the other hand, China’s fast economic development stimulated 
growth and changes in East Asia as well as in the world. China, according to the liberal 
perspective, has become an engine of growth and a catalyst for regional integration (Economy 
2005; Ahn: 2004; Beeson 2005; Hale and Hale 2003). As Beeson (2005) argues, China has 
already been considered a central place as a driver of regional economic activity, ‘something 
that would seem to make greater East Asian regionalism more likely than not’ (Beeson 2005, 
p.981). 
China has actively participated in various international and regional economic institutions 
(Pearson 1999, Harris 2004, Cai 2005, Leong 2001, Vatikiotis 2003). Through China’s 
                                                 
4 However, power still plays an important role in Keohane and Nye’s theory. Two important concepts are 
‘sensitivity and vulnerability’, details see Keohane and Nye (1977). 
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participation in these international and regional organizations, some liberals believe that these 
organizations moderate and restrain China’s foreign policy behaviour and encourage more 
cooperative actions. Margaret Pearson (1999) examines China’s incorporation into the major 
multilateral economic institutions both at the global and regional level, such as the IMF, WTO 
and APEC. Strong evidence, according to Pearson, suggests that these international and 
regional organizations have successfully engaged China and encouraged it to ‘play by the rules 
of the game’ (Pearson 1999, p.207).  
With the growing economic interdependence between states, some scholars, such as Xia (2001) 
and Cha (1999), argue that many states prefer to solve their disputes through peaceful ways. 
Yahuda (2005) points out that, given China’s previous relative isolation and its inexperience in 
institutionalized cooperation, regional multilateral institutions have provided platforms for 
China and its neighbours to work together and to minimize conflicts. At the same time, China 
has made great efforts to maintain peace and mitigate conflicts with its neighbouring states. 
Victor Cha (1999), David Rousseau (2003) and Yuen Foong Khong (1999) show in their work 
that there have been impressive improvements in China’s relations with South Korea and some 
Southeast Asian states, such as Singapore. According to Cha (1999), China’s relationship with 
South Korea improved dramatically in the 1990s. Nowadays, China is perceived as a ‘status 
quo’ power rather than a ‘revisionist power’ by many South Koreans (Cha 1999, p.35-36). 
According to Zhang and Tang (2005), through the adoption of a more cooperative approach 
towards East Asia, China hopes that other states in the region will regard China’s rapid 
economic growth as a source of opportunity than that of a threat. 
A large amount of liberal/neoliberal discussions on China’s cooperative behaviour in regional 
cooperation against the context of economic interdependence generally focus on two main 
aspects: China’s relations with Southeast Asia and China’s relations with Japan.  
According to the neoliberal perspective, the closer economic cooperation between China and 
ASEAN has promoted a more cordial atmosphere and cooperative relations between them in 
political and security spheres (Cai 2005; Shambaugh 2005; Lampton 2005). In October 2003, 
China formally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, becoming the first non-
ASEAN state to do so. Lampton (2005, p.315) argues that, given China’s (as well as others’) 
use of force in the South China Sea from time to time (most notably at Mischief Reef in 1995), 
China’s willingness to sign this treaty is notable. This unprecedented step commits China to the 
core elements of ASEAN’s 1967 charter. Having also signed the Declaration on Conduct in the 
South China Sea, China has now formally committed itself to the principles of nonaggression 
and noninterference, as well as a variety of other conflict resolution mechanisms (Shambaugh 
2005). 
In addition, many liberal/neoliberal scholars emphasize that the strong, growing economic 
interdependence between China and Japan is crucially important to their relationship as a whole 
(Yoichiro 2003; Yang 2003; Yahuda 2006). According to them, economic relations between 
China and Japan can be characterized as complementary rather than competitive, reflecting the 
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gap in the level of development (Kwan 2002; Klein 1998; Austin and Harris 2001). Austin and 
Harris (2001) note that China has many natural resources that Japan needs. Japan, on the other 
hand, has the capital, technology and human skills China needs for its modernization and 
industrialization. Thus, China and Japan share mutual interests in proceeding with economic 
cooperation.  
As stated above, liberal perspectives, especially those centred on the consequences of economic 
interdependence, have no difficulty in explaining the peaceful evolution of relations between 
China and economic development of East Asia in terms of regional cooperation since the late 
1990s. Economic interdependence between China and its neighbouring states creates interests 
in stable, cooperative political relations by increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts (Xia 
2001). Interdependence theorists are therefore interested in evidence of increasing economic 
contact and integration between China and East Asian states in the context of East Asian 
cooperation under the framework of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and would assume that political 
stability would follow economic interests. And they can point to the marked improvement of 
China and Southeast Asian economic and political relations since the late 1990s (Cai 2003; Ba 
2003; Leong 2001; Vatikiotis 2003). 
3.3 Limitations of liberal/neoliberal perspectives 
Liberals who focus on economic interdependence, to some extent, tend to oversimplify the 
complicated nature of international relations in East Asia and to ignore some of the potential 
problems behind economic interdependence. In particular, the two examples regarding Sino-
Japanese relations and Cross-Strait relations between the mainland China and Taiwan challenge 
economic interdependence perspective that the economic interdependence will decrease the 
likelihood of political conflicts. 
In the first case, the economic interdependence explanation sits uneasily with the continuous 
deterioration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations since the late 1990s in the context of East 
Asian regional cooperation under the APT framework. Certainly, the economic 
interdependence between China and Japan is important to overall Sino-Japanese relations and 
the leaders of both sides have reached common grounds on the significance of their economic 
interdependence (Yahuda 2006, p.166). However, the close economic interdependence failed to 
prevent the deterioration of their diplomatic relations. One of the main reasons for the 
deterioration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations is due to the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit 
to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine—Japan’s military cemetery. For the Chinese government, these 
visits demonstrate that the Japanese government has not repented the history that the Japanese 
invaded China during the 1930s and 1940s. Since the late 1990s the overall diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan have been even worse than before. It seems that the economic 
interdependence by itself can neither resolve disputes over history nor reduce the mistrust 
between China and Japan. Therefore, Buszynski’s criticism could be right that ‘when two 
countries which have a history of conflict and rivalry are brought together in a situation of tight 
interdependence the increased sensitivity may aggravate the relationship’ (Buszynski 2009, 
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p.146). In this sense, the Sino-Japanese relationship in the APT framework  in East Asia 
challenges the interdependence perspective.  
In addition, the general interdependence argument that economic interdependence would lead 
to reductions of conflicts and improvements of political relations does not work in relation to 
Taiwan. As Taiwan is one of the largest twenty economies in the world and is a major 
component of the investment and production network in East Asia, the involvement of Taiwan 
into regional cooperation network in East Asia would have brought more benefits to East Asian 
states. Economic interdependence theorists cannot easily explain why China has proactively 
pursued the regional economic integration process in the framework of APT, but at the same 
time strongly opposed the participation of Taiwan in the integration of this regional cooperation 
framework. 
These two exceptional examples suggest that in some situations, economic interdependence 
alone could not be sufficient to lead to the improvement of political relations. Although 
economic connections and interdependence between China and Japan as well as between 
mainland China and Taiwan have deepened, there is no obvious sign that economic 
interdependence spills over into other aspects of their relations, especially in the political and 
security aspects.  
Another weakness of the liberal institutionalism analysis (as well as the realist theories) on 
China’s rise and its regional strategy is its ‘state-centric’ focus. Neoliberal scholars, such as 
Robert Koehane (1984) and David Mitrany (1943), tend to black box domestic politics. Like 
realists, they treat states as units and domestic politics play little role in states’ foreign 
behaviour. Regarding China’s regional strategy in East Asian cooperation, this weakness also 
exists.  Few scholars in the economic interdependence literature consider whether Chinese 
bureaucratic politics plays a role in the decision-making of China’s regional policies or whether 
domestic issues in China have any systematic influence on China’s promotion of regional 
cooperation in East Asia. Was China’s promotion for regional financial cooperation related to 
its internal vulnerability in banking system? Was it oriented from the pressure of domestic 
unemployment in South China? 
4. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
The debate over China’s rise and its regional strategy in East Asia is dominated by realism and 
neoliberalism theories, which provide valuable insights on this issue. However, both 
perspectives pay little attention to the ideational side of the debate, such as values and identities 
in shaping the decision of policy makers. This limitation has given rise to other perspectives, in 
particular constructivism.  
4.1 Constructivism theories  
Constructivism focuses on the constitutive role of norms, identities or shared understanding of 
individuals and states (Ruggie 1998). Rather than emphasizing that international politics is a 
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world of recurrence and repetition, as realists do, Nicholas Onuf (1989) argues that 
international politics is a ‘world of our making’. It means that ideas, beliefs and values shape 
social identities of political actors and also influence the behaviour and actions of political 
actors.  
Many constructivists believe that the identity of the state determines its interests, and its actions. 
Wendt points out that ‘identities are the basis of interests’ (Wendt 1992, p.398) and ‘material 
resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in 
which they are embedded’ (Wendt 1995, p.73). In this sense, constructivism helps to 
understand how these states choose their interests and preferences. In contrast, rationalist 
approaches (such as realism and liberalism) focus on strategic questions such as how states 
pursue their goals and how states calculate costs and benefits of different actions. However, 
they cannot tell what state preferences are and where such preferences come from.   
4.2 Constructivist perspectives on the rise of China 
Generally speaking, few constructivist scholars have directly addressed China’s rise and its 
regional strategy in East Asia. 5   They usually put a central emphasis on the role of the 
ideational factors in shaping China’s regional behaviour. 
                                                
Some constructivists stress the role of national identity6 in explaining China’s foreign policy in 
general (Gries 2004; Carlson 2004; Rozman 2004). From the 1990s, as Rozman has argued, 
China has increasingly pursued a ‘great power identity’ (Rozman 2004). The great power 
identity is largely shaped by a state’s enduring perception of other great powers and the 
interaction between them (Rozman 2004, p.120). Rozman emphasizes that these three great 
power relations play an important role in shaping China’s great power identity.  
In line with Rozman’s perspective, other scholars, such as Michael Leifer, Andrew Nathan and 
Robert Ross, explore the historical reason for China’s great power identity. Nathan and Ross 
suggest that, ‘in contrast to the self-confident American nationalism of manifest destiny, 
Chinese nationalism is powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride’ (Nathan and 
Ross 1997, p.34). It is true that many Chinese are proud of China’s civilization and are also 
shamed by the ‘century of humiliation’ (bai nian guo chi). The concept of ‘century of 
 
5 In contrast, many realist and liberal literatures address factors such as historical memory and perceptions of 
China. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt explain that there is little difference between rationalism and 
constructivism on the issue whether ideas matter (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 59). The difference is how important 
the ideas are. 
6 National identity, according to Rozman, is defined as ‘a statement of the uniqueness of a particular nation-state, 
investing it with authority and separating it from other states that may seek to influence it’. National identities have 
two components: current interactions with other states and their own history.  
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humiliation’7 (bai nian guo chi), which refers to the period that Chinese suffered at the hands of 
western imperialists from the 1840s, has a significant impact on the nature of Chinese national 
identity. China’s economic rise since 1990s provides it an opportunity to regain its feeling of 
national pride and, at the same time, to erase its humiliation.  
For constructivists, whether China poses a threat to East Asia is not determined by China’s 
substantial growth in economic and military might. Rather, it is about imagination. In other 
words, it depends on the perceptions of how other states interpret China’s behaviour (Alagappa 
1998; Kang 2004). In order to evaluate the perceptions of states, Alagappa suggests examining 
the strategies that other states use to deal with the rise of China.  
Some constructivists, such as Kang (2004), hold an optimistic view on China’s rise. For Kang, 
East Asian states have accommodated rather than balanced China’s emergence. The absence of 
balancing against China is originated from a mix of interests and identities. In particular, 
identity is central in framing how regional states interpret China’s rise (Kang 2007, p.4). Kang 
argues that East Asian states share many similar views and principles with China regarding 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian states have 
deep ethnic, cultural and historical ties with China.  
Kang’s view seems over-optimistic. To some extent, the conception of sovereignty is definitely 
important. It can be seen from China’s refusal to use multilateral institutions to solve 
sovereignty disputes, such as the South China Sea dispute. However, Kang cannot explain why 
the sovereignty identity, among the numerous factors and tradition in Chinese history and 
experience, is the most important factor in shaping its current national identity. It is still 
ambiguous as to under which condition the sovereignty identity plays a more important role 
than other aspects, such as great power identity, in China’s identity formation. In addition, 
Kang could not give a  decisive answer to the question whether China’s ‘peaceful rise’ 
character will remain in the future, if China achieves unquestioned great power status.  
Some other constructivists, such as Muthiah Alagappa (1998), consider that the rise of China 
poses a certain challenge to the international community and to East Asia. The China threat, he 
argues, comes from the perceptions of other states, which view China’s behaviour as a threat to 
their security. These ideas have been shaped by military or economic competition. This 
competition has created their fears and mistrust.  
However, according to Alagappa (1998), East Asian states do not have a common perception 
about the China threat. Some, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, perceive China as a real threat. 
Some others, such as South Korea, Thailand, are aware of China as a big power, but do not 
perceive it as a threat. Still others, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, feel a degree of threat from 
                                                 
7 Generally speaking, ‘Century of Humiliation’ refers to the hundred years of national humiliation. It is about the 
period that China suffered at the hands of imperial foreign powers, from the First Opium War in 1840 to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  
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China. Their concerns come either from South China Sea dispute, or from the existence of 
economically powerful Chinese communities in their states. 
4.3 Explaining China’s engagement in regional cooperation in East Asia since the late 
1990s 
In constructivist view, two ideational factors could contribute to China’s enthusiasm towards 
regional cooperation in East Asia (e.g. ASEAN Plus Three) since the late 1990s. First of all, 
China’s perception of regional institutions and regional cooperation has been going through a 
huge change, from suspicion in the early 1990s to enthusiasm in the late 1990s. Since the early 
1990s China has started to participate in regional institutions in Asia. Kuik (2005) illustrates 
that in the early 1990s China remained suspicious about regional institutions, such as APEC 
and ARF. In China’s perception, these institutions might be used by some other states to 
challenge China’s sovereignty or to limit its strategic choice. Accordingly, China’s 
participation in these regional institutions was mainly passive. After a period of participating 
and observing for several years, China gradually saw regional cooperation as a useful 
diplomatic way to promote its own foreign policy goals. The shift in perception caused a 
change in China’s actual participation in these regional institutions. In other words, China’s 
growing active involvement in regional cooperation in East Asia was partly attributed to 
China’s early experience in regional institutions, which not only shifted China’s perception of 
regional cooperation, but also improved its confidence towards regional cooperation. 
In addition to the shift in perception, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98 contributed to 
China’s pursuit of regional cooperation in the post-Crisis era. For Stubbs (2002) and Terada 
(2003), the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98 helped to promote the emergence of an ‘East 
Asia’ identity and self-other distinction. In this sense, the Asian Financial Crisis, as a shared 
experience among East Asian states, helped China (as well as other East Asian states) to realize 
that East Asian states are interdependent with each other and belong to the same area. In this 
context, the Chinese government could be seen as having concluded that it was imperative to 
establish a regional approach to deal with the similar issues in the future.  
4.4 Limitations of Constructivism on China’s rise and regional strategy 
Constructivism adds a social dimension which realism and liberalism ignore. However, the 
constructivist view on China’s rise and its regional strategy is limited in two aspects. First, little 
attention has been given to the Chinese view.  The existing literature on Chinese perceptions of 
its rise and its regional cooperation in East Asia is inadequate. Most of the work is based on 
Western perspectives. The Chinese side of the story needs to be heard. On the one hand, the 
views of Chinese policymakers on regional cooperation as well as on the East Asian powers–
Japan and the US–have not been sufficiently and systematically explored in relation to its self 
identity and regional role. After all, they influence the thinking of government decision making 
and are primary sources to their thoughts. An exploration of their perspectives on regional 
cooperation is valuable. On the other, the original Chinese sources have not been fully 
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addressed to analyze Chinese perceptions of regionalism. Even though some address Chinese 
perception, such as Gries (2004), this work is short of theoretical and systematic depth. There is 
a lack of a deep application of constructivist theories to the examinations of Chinese 
perceptions. How does Chinese view the so-called ‘shared regional identity’ in East Asia in 
relation with its self-identity and its regional role? How does Chinese national identity (great 
power identity or sovereignty identity) play a role in shaping China’s regional strategy in East 
Asia?  
Second, constructivist approaches do not adequately address the question of why the ideational 
factor (shared value or regional identity) is more important in pushing China to pursue regional 
cooperation than material interests (economic or military interests). As discussed before, 
constructivists emphasize the emergence of a shared value or regional identity in China as well 
as other East Asian states. How important is this ‘emerging regional identity’ in influencing 
China’s outlook of regional strategy? Is keeping the sovereignty identity becoming less 
important in China’s regional policy in East Asia than achieving economic or military interests? 
Have regional cooperation had much impact on China’s sovereignty conception?  
5. CONCLUSION 
Overall, realism, liberalism and constructivism have offered valuable theoretical perspectives 
on China’s rise and regional strategy. Realist perspectives attempt to understand China’s 
regional behaviour on the basis of power and the structure of the international system. 
Liberal/neoliberal perspectives emphasize the importance of international institutions and seek 
to explain China’s regional posture in the context of economic interdependence. In addition, 
constructivism provides an ideational source of international relations and stresses the influence 
of national identity, culture and belief on China’s foreign policy behaviour. These different 
perspectives in the existing literature provide useful insights for the further exploration of the 
reasons why China has actively pursued regional cooperation in the framework of APT since 
the late 1990s. 
However, all these perspectives fail to fully explain China’s new active posture and strategies 
towards regional cooperation in East Asia in the post-Crisis era. The economic interdependence 
perspective cannot provide satisfactory explanations of the complexity of Sino-Japanese 
relations in the APT or the Taiwan issue. The China hegemony perspective fails to explain the 
reason why China actively supports the Chiang Mai Initiative and Asian Bond Markets 
Iniitative in which Japan plays a central role, or accurately evaluate China’s hegemonic 
capability in East Asia in the post-Crisis era. Constructivism alone cannot provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question why or/and in which conditions ideational factors, rather than material 
interests, are the most important factor influencing China’s regional posture in East Asia.   
Here, one size does not and cannot fit all. All three perspectives are too general and too 
simplified to explain China’s strategy. They fail to see that China’s involvements in regional 
cooperation are not the same in different areas. For instance, in the area of regional trade 
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cooperation, by promoting the FTAs China is leading the process. In regional financial 
cooperation, China’s role seems to be much weaker than Japan. Why in a specific area or at a 
specific time did China adopt one strategy rather than others?  
Each theoretical framework alone is inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of China’s 
regional behaviour. To be sure, each perspective is important. However, they seem to isolate 
the factors of power, interests and identity. Each of them emphasizes one factor at the expense 
of others. As Katzenstein and Okawara have said, ‘the complex links between power, interest, 
and norms defy analytic capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by 
drawing selectively on different paradigms – that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony’ 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 2001: 3). It is necessary to explore the interconnection between 
power, interest and identity, rather than separating them. In this sense, only a combination of 
material interests (powers, interest, geopolitical strategy, etc.) and ideational factors (national 
identity, ideas, values, etc.), and attention to both the domestic level and the systematic level 
can deepen our understanding of China’s regional behaviour and strategy. Therefore, a more 
eclectic approach on China’s regional strategy in East Asia could be helpful.   
In addition, this article has also demonstrated that the existing literature lacks a systematic and 
in-depth examination of Chinese perspectives on regional cooperation in East Asia since the 
late 1990s. While the Western perspectives on China’s regional strategy in East Asia have been 
well explored, work on Chinese perspectives of this issue remains insufficient. On the one hand, 
the rich and diverse Chinese language sources emerging from the late 1990s to 2000s have not 
been sufficiently exploited to examine Chinese perspectives on regional cooperation. On the 
other hand, there has been a lack of work which examines Chinese perspectives in a systematic 
and in-depth theoretical manner. To some extent, the inadequacy is understandable due to the 
complication of Chinese languages as well as the lack of information openness and 
liberalization in China. In order to fill this gap, we should explore Chinese perspectives on 
regional cooperation in East Asia by extensively exploring Chinese sources and materials.   
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